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The New Starker: A Nonsimultaneous Exchange
Expands Section 1031/ Collateral
Estoppel Clarification
The new Starker decision addresses the issue whether a nonsimultaneous
exchange qualifies for section 1031 nonrecognition treatment. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in addressing this issue, also had to deter-
mine the appropriateness of the collateral estoppel "separable facts" doc-
trine under the facts in the case. The author provides an in-depth
examination of the court's clarification of collateral estoppel and expan-
sion of section 1031. The author, in agreeing with-the decision, welcomes
the added flexibility the case lends to the real estate finance field.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to section 1031(a) 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, no
gain 2 or loss 3 shall be recognized, 4 if property held for use in
1. The Internal Revenue Code provides in relevant part:
(a) Non-recognition of gain or loss from exchanges solely in kind.
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in
trade or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other
property held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action,
certificates of trust or beneficial interests, or other securities or evidences
of indebtedness or interest) is exchanged solely for property of like kind
to be held either for productive use in trade or business for investment.
I.R.C. § 1031(a).
2. In order to give the reader a better insight to the case, the following terms,
used through this note, are defined as follows: Gain-'The gain from a sale or
other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom
over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 [of the Internal Revenue Code]
for determining gain .... " I.R.C. § 1001(a).
Loss-"The loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis over the amount real-
ized." I.R.C. § 1001(a).
Recognition-"The entire amount of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of
property shall be recognized [taxable] subject to specific exceptions." I.R.C.
§ 1001(c).
Like kind property-"Refers to the nature or character of property. Property of
the same class is like kind property; therefore, exchanging improved or unim-
proved property qualifies for nonrecognition of gain or loss." Treas. Regs.
§ 1031(b) (1967).
Tax-free exchange-This term is somewhat of a misnomer. The author, when re-
ferring to a tax-free exchange, is actually referring to a tax-deferred exchange pur-
suant to section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Taxpayer-The person seeking tax-deferred exchange treatment on the disposi-
tion of his property.
Buyer-The accommodation party in the exchange. Generally, this party will ei-
trade or business or for investment is exchanged for "like kind"5
property. This is an important exception to the general rule that
all gain or loss realized on the sale or exchange of property must
be recognized for federal tax purposes. 6
Until recently, it was thought that in order for an exchange to
qualify under section 1031, the exchange of title had to take place
simultaneously.7 However, in the recent case of Starker v. United
States8 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that cer-
tain nonsimultaneous exchanges can qualify as section 1031 ex-
changes. This decision could have a potentially great impact on
the real estate investment market because it removes one of the
major difficulties in accomplishing a tax-free exchange.9 This dif-
ficulty has been the complexity involved in the arrangement of si-
multaneous transfers of title in multiparty transactions. 0
This note will examine several issues in Starker with a special
emphasis on the nonsimultaneous exchanges. The note will begin
with an examination of the pertinent facts of Starker, followed by
a brief historical view of the law concerning collateral estoppel.
The note will then discuss the impact of the court's analysis of
collateral estoppel and the court's treatment of like kind ex-
changes.
II. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
On April 1, 1967, T.J. Starker (T.J.), his son and daughter-in-law,
Bruce and Elizabeth Starker, entered into a "land exchange
agreement" with Crown Zellerbach Corporation (Crown). The
agreement provided that the three Starkers would convey their
interests in 1,843 acres of timberland in Oregon and Washington
to Crown. Crown agreed, in return, to acquire and deed to the
ther be the seller of the property that the taxpayer acquires in the exchange or the
ultimate buyer of the taxpayer's property.
Exchange property-property received by the taxpayer.
3. See note 2 supra, and accompanying text.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the
gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of property
shall be recognized." I.R.C. § 1001(c) (emphasis added).
7. See Note, The Five-Year Like-Kind Exchange, 55 NEB. L. REV. 511 (1976)
(discussing the implications of Starker I).
8. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Starker].
9. This is due to the fact that very few natural exchanges exist. Taxpayers
usually set up agreements that require the buyer to purchase exchange property
from third parties solely for the purpose of exchange. One of the major barriers to
this type of exchange has been the difficulty in arranging the simultaneous trans-
fer of titles. The Starker holding removes this barrier. This aspect will be dis-
cussed thoroughly under the section 1031 impact section of this note.
10. See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
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Starkers other real property suitable to the Starkers within a five
year period, or to pay the outstanding balance in cash. In addi-
tion to account for timber grown (if necessary) over the five year
period, a "growth factor" of six percent of the outstanding balance
was to be credited to the Starker account on an annual basis.
On May 31, 1967, the Starkers deeded their property to Crown,
with Crown entering a $1,502,500 exchange value credit on its
books for T.J. and a $73,000 credit for Bruce and Elizabeth. Within
four months, Bruce and Elizabeth designated, and Crown
purchased and conveyed, suitable property pursuant to the con-
tract. This conveyance fulfilled Crown's obligation to Bruce and
Elizabeth, and no cash was transferred.
The closing of the transaction with T.J. took a longer period of
time due to the large credit balance. Between 1967 and 1969,
Crown purchased twelve parcels designated by T.J. from third
parties. Of these twelve parcels, nine were conveyed to T.J.. At
T.J.'s direction, two of the twelve parcels (hereinafter designated
as the Timian and Bi-Mart properties) were conveyed to his
daughter, Jean Roth. Title was never in T.J.'s name as to these
properties.
The final property (the Booth parcel) was a commercial parcel,
title to which was never conveyed to T.J.. Crown acquired a third
party's contract right to purchase the property, and then reas-
signed the contract right to T.J.. This third party's contract right
arose under a 1965 sales agreement on the Booth land. Under that
agreement, the original transferor held a life estate in the prop-
erty and legal title did not pass until the life estate expired.
Meanwhile, the holders of the contract to purchase were entitled
to possession, subject to certain restrictions. These restrictions
prohibited the purchasers from removing improvements and re-
quired them to keep buildings and fences in good repair. Pursu-
ant to the agreement, a substantial portion of the purchase price
was to have been invested, with a fixed return to be paid to the
purchaser of the life interest. If there was a default on any of
these conditions, the agreement provided that the sellers could
elect to rescind the contract.
The first real property transfer was on September 5, 1967. The
twelfth and last transfer was on May 21, 1969. By 1969, T.J.'s credit
balance had increased from $1,502,500 to $1,577,387.91 due to the
six percent growth factor. The twelve properties transferred by
Crown to T.J. (and Jean Roth) had a value of $1,577,387.91. Hence,
no cash was paid to T.J.. His balance was reduced to zero; thus,
the transaction was concluded with no gain or loss to either party.
In 1967, the Starkers reported no gain on their respective in-
come tax returns, claiming nonrecognition treatment under sec-
tion 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code."1 The Internal Revenue
Service disagreed and assessed deficiencies of $35,248.41 against
Bruce and Elizabeth and $300,930.31 against T.J.. The Starkers
paid the deficiencies and filed claims for refunds. When the
claims for refunds were denied, the Starkers filed two actions for
refunds in the United States District Court in Oregon.
In the first case, Starker v. United States,12 Judge Solomon held
that Alderson v. Commissioner13 compelled a decision for the tax-
payers. Although Alderson did not involve a nonsimultaneous ex-
change, it did allow great latitude in transacting three-corner
exchanges.' 4 The court particularly approved the designation of
the exchange property by the taxpayer and approved a provision
in the exchange agreement that allowed the taxpayer to sell for
cash if it was impossible to effectuate an exchange.15 Both of
these provisions were also included in the Starker-Crown agree-
ment.
Bruce and Elizabeth recovered the tax refund. The Internal
Revenue Service appealed, but voluntarily withdrew the appeal.
Thus, the judgment for Bruce and Elizabeth Starker became
final.16
In the second case, Starker v. United States,17 the Government
asserted that T.J. was not entitled to nonrecognition treatment
and that he was liable for tax on the growth factor as a disguised
interest.'8 The district court held for the Government on both is-
sues. 19 T.J. appealed on three contentions: first, the Government
was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue; second, the
11. See note 1 supra, and accompanying text.
12. 75-1 T.C.M. (CCH) 9443 (D. Or. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Starker I].
13. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
14. See note 76 infra, and accompanying text.
15. 317 F.2d at 779-83.
16. 602 F.2d at 1343.
17. 432 F. Supp. 864 (D. Or. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Starker III.
18. Starker and Crown included in their exchange agreement a "growth fac-
tor" of six percent. This factor was to be multiplied by the outstanding Starker
credit balance on Crown's books. The growth factor was to account for timber
growth until the exchange was completed. The Government argued that this
amount was merely disguised interest and therefore taxable to the taxpayer as or-
dinary income. 602 F.2d at 1343, 1356.
19. Judge Solomon, who heard both Starker I and Starker II, reversed himself
with remarkable candor by saying:
I have reconsidered my opinion in Starker . I now conclude that I was
mistaken in my holding as well as my earlier reading of Alderson. Even if
Alderson can be interpreted as contended by the plaintiff, I think that to
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trial court erred in holding his transaction with Crown did not
qualify for nonrecognition treatment under section 1031; and
finally, that the transaction did not cause him to have ordinary in-
come from the "growth factor." The court addressed the issue of
collateral estoppel first because the determination of that issue
would directly affect the Government's right to litigate the other
issues.
III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL ISSUE
A. Historical Preview
Collateral estoppel is an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata20
that precludes relitigation of issues previously adjudicated.2 1 A
judgment in a prior action may be held conclusive as to issues in
a subsequent case, even though the later case technically involves
a different cause of action.22 The role of collateral estoppel in the
do so would be improper. It would merely sanction a tax avoidance
scheme and not carry out the purposes of § 1031.
432 F. Supp. at 868.
20. The term "res judicata" covers the general law of finality and effect of prior
judgments as influencing subsequent litigation. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 3
Introductory Note (1942) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 3; Introductory Note (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). Although
collateral estoppel is sometimes regarded as a branch of res judicata, the two doc-
trines are quite different. Both involve the conclusive effect of judgments in the
subsequent actions. The difference lies in the fact that in res judicata, the subse-
quent suit involves the same cause of action, while in collateral estoppel the sub-
sequent suit involves the same issue. See GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 207-24
(1972).
21. Other doctrines under the general "res judicata" heading include merger,
bar, and direct estoppel. Merger and bar preclude parties from relitigating the
same cause of action. If a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, his cause of ac-
tion is merged in the judgment and he cannot, thereafter, bring another suit on the
same cause of action. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at §§ 45(a), 47. E.g., Dearden
v. Hey, 304 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d 644 (1939). If a judgment is rendered on the merits
against the plaintiff, the original cause of action is barred. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 20, at §§ 45(b), 48. E.g., Thompson v. Washington National Bank, 68 Wash. 42,
122 P. 606 (1912). Direct estoppel precludes the plaintiff from litigating the same
issue that was litigated in a prior action. For example, if an action is dismissed for
the nonjoinder of a third party as defendant, and the plaintiff brings another ac-
tion on the same cause of action, the necessity of joinder may not be relitigated.
Where a judgment for the defendant is not based on the merits, however, the
plaintiff is not barred from maintaining a subsequent action. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 20, at §§ 45(d), 49.
22. Collateral estoppel may apply to questions of law as well as fact, provided
that both causes of action arise out of the same subject matter or transaction. RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 70. E.g., Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620,
626 (1933); United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 241-42 (1924).
judicial system is to conserve judicial energy,23 avoid excessive
litigant expense, 24 and to minimize inconsistent results. 25 Coun-
tervailing policy concerns include: the right of each person to
have his day in court;26 the danger of perpetuating error;2 7 and
other considerations of fairness.28 Whether a court will apply col-
lateral estoppel in a given case will often be determined by weigh-
ing these conflicting concerns. 29.
Where collateral estoppel is asserted between parties to a suit,
the party who claims the benefit of collateral estoppel (propo-
nent) must show that the very fact or point presently at issue was
23. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (the Court stated the
doctrine "rests upon considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy
favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations"); In Re Hitchings, 342
F.2d 80, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (a normal goal of res judicata is the conservation of ju-
dicial time and energy); Westgate-Sun Harbor Co. v. Watson, 206 F.2d 458, 462
(D.C. Cir. 1953) (a goal of res judicata is to conserve judicial time and energy and
to promote the goal of an orderly judicial process); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-
Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REV. 217, 219 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Po-
lasky]; von Moschizisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 300 (1929).
24. Liddell v. Smith, 345 F.2d 491, 493 (7th Cir. 1965) (it is the public policy and
interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation as there is a financial
hardship if a litigant is vexed twice for the same cause of action); Wallingsford v.
Larcon Co., 237 F.2d 904, 906 (8th Cir. 1956) (where the party to be affected has liti-
gated or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a
court of competent jurisdiction, they should not be permitted to litigate it again to
the financial harassment of their opponent); Hyman v. Regenstein, 222 F.2d 545,
549 (5th Cir. 1955) (a man should not be vexed twice for the same cause of action);
Van Dyke v. Kuhl, 171 F.2d 187, 188 (7th Cir. 1948) (a man should not be vexed
twice for the same cause of action).
25. Developments in the Lau,-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 818, 820 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]. The same general policy concerns pervade
all aspects of res judicata. See Polasky, supra note 23, at 219. Consequently, pol-
icy discussions that apply to one aspect of res judicata may be relevant for other
aspects as well. E.g., Developments at 840 n.161.
26. The right to a day in court is required under the Due Process Clause. Han-
sberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247
U.S. 464, 476 (1918). Courts, however, have discussed the right in general terms
without mentioning constitutional mandates. See, e.g., United States v. Silliman,
167 F.2d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 1948).
27. United States v. Stone and Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 236 (1927). Res judi-
cata rests upon the assumption that the party affected, or some other party with
whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate, the same
matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction. It has been sug-
gested that the problem of error perpetuation may be greater where complex legal
issues are involved. Devine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1974).
Contra, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 331-34 (1971); Evans & Robins, The Demise of Mutuality in Collateral Estoppel
(The Second Round Patent Suit-The Not-So-Instant Replay), 24 OKLA. L. REV.
179, 205 (1971).
28. E.g., Title v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 322 F.2d 21, 24 (9th Cir.
1963).
29. Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971) (col-
lateral estoppel is qualified or rejected when its application would contravene an
overriding public policy or result in manifest injustice); Seven-Up Co. v. Bubble
Up Corp., 312 F.2d 472, 477 (3d Cir. 1963).
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litigated by the parties, and necessarily determined by a tribunal
in a prior action.30
1. Litigated by the Parties
Parties to the initial litigation do not always raise every issue or
point which might conceivably be relevant to the claim or de-
fense.31 In Cromwell v. County of Sacramento,32 the Supreme
Court addressed some of the reasons why every claim is not con-
tested to the utmost. The Court stated: "[T]he smallness of the
amount or the value of the property in controversy, the difficulty
of obtaining the necessary evidence, the expense of litigation...
[are reasons why every claim is not litigated to its fullest ex-
tent]."33 Other reasons include the fear of drawing the court's at-
tention from a strong claim to a weak one or of confusing the
issues by introducing collateral issues.
If a party omits some issue or point from the first action he is
precluded by a judgment from later raising that issue or point in a
subsequent action.34 To this extent, the parties are under pres-
sure to litigate the first cause of action to the utmost.
The proponent has the burden of introducing evidence to show
that the issue or point presently at issue was also at issue in a for-
mer action. Generally, matters are put in issue by the pleadings.
30. Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Greenfield v. Mather,
32 Cal. 2d 23, 35, 194 P.2d 1, 8 (1948); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables; Ad-
judicating Bodies, 54 GEo. L.J. 857, 858 (1966). For example, collateral estoppel
will be applied only to issues that actually were litigated and determined in the
previous action and that were essential. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 337-38
(1957); Cromwell v. County of Sacramento, 94 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1876); see Comment,
Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, .56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-15 (1942); the court in
Evergeens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928-29 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720
(1944), distinguished between "ultimate" and "mediate" facts. Only determina-
tions of ultimate facts, upon whose combined occurence raises the duty, or right in
question, would be conclusive in subsequent actions. Mediate facts were de-
scribed by the court as facts which infer the existence of other facts upon which
the law raises a duty or right. 141 F.2d at 928. The policy behind this distinction is
explored in Polasky, supra note 23, at 237-38. For a catalog and discussion of other
principles that may limit the application of collateral estoppel, see Developments,
supra note 25, at 840-50.
31. Polasky, supra note 23, at 222; RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 68(2);
Comment, Consent Judgment as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 177-78
(1959).
32. 94 U.S. 351 (1877).
33. Id. at 356.
34. See generally Collateral Estoppel & Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1942);
Polasky, supra note 23; Developments, supra note 25, at 840-50.
However, they may also be put in issue by the proof without be-
ing reflected in the pleadings. 35 Clearly the pleadings of a previ-
ous action are available for the purpose of establishing what was
at issue, but the proof is not limited to the pleadings. Any portion
of the record in the prior action may also be used.
2. The Issue Must Have Been Determined
The fact or point placed in issue by the parties in a prior action,
must also have been determined by the court in that action before
collateral estoppel can be asserted.36 It is this determination
which binds the parties, if all other requisites of collateral estop-
pel are met.3 7
A frequent problem is presented by the need to show in the
second action what was actually determined in the first. This
problem is most acute when there is a general jury verdict, which
is often ambiguous. Unless the ambiguity is resolved by ad-
missable evidence, the proponent will be precluded from assert-
ing collateral estoppel unless any possible ground for the former
decision is legally sufficient to bring him the result he desires. 38
3. Determination Necessary to the Result
For collateral estoppel to be applicable, in regard to a fact issue,
determination of the issue must have been necessary to the result
in the first action. 39 This requirement can be illustrated by the
35. See generally J. FLEMING JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE (1965) [hereinafter cited as
FLEMING]. The author states:
Most if not all modern systems provide for the amendment of pleadings at
(or after) trial to conform to the proof where an issue not included in the
pleadings is litigated by consent of the parties. And this consent need not
be expressed. It may be inferred from the conduct of the party, such as
the failure to object to evidence or the introduction of counter-evidence to
meet it.
Id. § 5.7 at 168 (footnotes omitted).
36. E.g., Cromwell v. County of Sacramento, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Buromin Co. v.
National Aluminate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214 (D. Del. 1947). Contra, Denio v. City of
Huntington Beach, 74 Cal. App. 2d 424, 168 P.2d 785, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 773
(1946); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. McKeithen, 130 Fla. 568, 178 So. 127 (1938).
See also Polasky, supra note 23, at 222.
37. The other requisites of collateral estoppel included: first, that the issue
was litigated by the parties; and second, that the issue was necessarily determined
by the parties. For an in-depth discussion of collateral estoppel see FLEMMING,
supra note 35, at 575.
38. See Myrha v. Park, 193 Minn. 290, 258 N.W. 515 (1935). The court, with ref-
erence to the plaintiff trying to avoid collateral estoppel, stated: "But plaintiff can
get no comfort therefrom because a finding upon any of the fact issues here in-
volved against him defeats his present claim as fully and as effectively as did the
verdict in the prior case." Id. at 295-96, 258 N.W. at 518 (emphasis added).
39. See Maze v. Mihalovich, [19791 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 578, 387 N.E.2d 196
(1979) ("[Collateral estoppel applies to] matters which were necessarily involved
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following example. An initial cause of action is filed for personal
injury caused by C's negligence. It ends in a judgment for the de-
fendant pursuant to an explicit finding that plaintiff's conduct
constitutes contributory negligence. The court also explicitly
finds that C is negligent. The finding that C is negligent is held
not binding in a later action because it is not necessary to support
the prior judgment, although explicitly made.40 It is not an alter-
native ground for the judgment, because its' tendency is to work
in the opposite direction of the judgment.
Three practical considerations support this rule. First, the par-
ties' attention and efforts are likely to be focused on points and
matters which are necessary to the result. Second, the tribunal's
attention is likely to be focused on the grounds necessary for its
decision. Finally, unnecessary findings are usually not subject to
appellate review.
4. The Sunnen Doctrine (Separable Facts Test)
In Commissioner v. Sunnen,41 the United States Supreme Court
and all issues which [were] actually tried and determined."); Albano v. Jordan
Marsh Co., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 362 N.E.2d 219 (1977).
40. This illustration is based upon the factual situation of Cambria v. Jeffery,
307 Mass. 49, 29 N.E.2d 555 (1940). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 68,
Comment 0, Illustration 10 (citing the facts of Cambria).
41. 333 U.S. 591 (1948). The taxpayer in Sunnen was an inventor who had li-
censed a corporation, which he controlled, to manufacture various devices under a
series of contracts beginning in 1928. The taxpayer then assigned these contracts
to his wife.
In a previous case, the Board of Tax Appeal had dealt with the taxpayer's in-
come tax liability for the years 1929-31 under a contract made in 1928. In that case,
the Commissioner had contended that the income of the assigned contract was
taxable to the taxpayer, but the Board of Tax Appeals found for the taxpayer
(Sunnen). In the second case, involving the years 1937 through 1941, income from
the 1928 contract was again in question, as well as income from virtually identical
contracts which had not been in question in the first litigation. The taxpayer as-
serted that collateral estoppel barred attempts to tax the income from any of the
licensing contracts to him. The Tax Court held that collateral estoppel applied to
the 1928 contract, so that its income could not be taxed to the taxpayer, but that
the doctrine did not apply to the other contracts. See Joseph Sunnen, 6 T.C. 431
(1946). In regard to the other contracts, the Tax Court held that intervening deci-
sions had changed the law since the first case, and that the income arising from
these contracts was taxable to the taxpayer.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the 1928 contract, but
reversed on other grounds without reaching the issue of collateral estoppel on the
other contracts. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 161 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1947). On certio-
rari, the Supreme Court reversed the eighth circuit entirely, thus awarding the
Commissioner a complete victory. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
The Supreme Court held that the later contracts had not been before the Board in
attempted to end the confusion surrounding the application of
collateral estoppel. Sunnen involved the question of the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel in tax law, and was concerned with the
careful restriction of collateral estoppel where circumstances of
fact or law have changed, or are dissimilar, between two actions.
The Court restricted the use of facts in situations where the two
actions were not identical. But the Court expressed this restric-
tion by the following:
[I]f the relevant facts in the two cases are separable, even though they be
similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues
which occur in the second case. Thus, the second proceeding may involve
an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separate from,
the one dealt with in the first proceeding.
42
The Court's statement encompassed two well established con-
cepts in traditional collateral estoppel doctrine: first, that collat-
eral estoppel does not govern purely legal issues which recur in a
second case; and second, no matter how much a case factually re-
sembles one previously litigated, no collateral estoppel concern-
ing an issue exists if that particular issue has not been litigated. 43
However, the language in Sunnen has been met with varying in-
terpretations. For example, in Philco v. United States,44 a war-
ranty offer had been interpreted as a "price adjustment" for tax
purposes in a prior suit. The Tax Court, citing Sunnen, refused to
apply collateral estoppel because "distinct and separate transac-
tions" were involved.45 But the warranty offers, which were the
basis of judgment in each case, had not changed between actions.
In another case, Alexander v. Commissioner,46 involving repeti-
tious claims, the Tax Court found that there had been no change
of material facts.47 Collateral estoppel was invoked since the
same question which confronted the Tax Court in the prior litiga-
tion was apparently being presented again. However, in the Tax
Court's zeal to compare only the "events and legal principles" of
the two actions, it overlooked the possibility that other circum-
stances might have changed since the last action, 48 even though
the previous case, and therefore, no estoppel existed. The Court also held that
with respect to the original 1928 contract, although the same subject matter had
already been adjudicated, intervening changes in the law made collateral estoppel
inapplicable.
42. 333 U.S. at 601 (footnotes omitted).
43. The first judgment is conclusive only "as to the point or question actually
litigated." Cromwell v. County of Sacramento, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876). This lan-
guage is also cited in Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 50 (1876).
44. 214 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Pa. 1963), affid, 335 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1964).
45. 335 F.2d at 894. After rejecting the collateral estoppel doctrine, the court
indicated that stare decisis may still be used. 214 F. Supp. 894.
46. 22 T.C. 318 (1954), rev'd in part, 224 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1955).
47. 22 T.C. at 320.
48. Alexander v. Commission, 224 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 1955).
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the "forms" of the action were identical. Thus, the Philco and Al-
exander cases seem to take Sunnen's concepts too literally in the
first instance, and to miss the focus of the case altogether in the
second.
The Sunnen "separate facts test" is significant in that the doc-
trine was in full force when Starker I was decided. However, sub-
sequent to Starker II the United States Supreme Court in
Montana v. United States49 limited the Sunnen test to cases in
which there had been a significant change in the legal climate. 50
The Court held collateral estoppel applicable, although some facts
differed in the two cases, because the differing facts were not "es-
sential to the judgment" or "of controlling significance" in the first
case.51 Thus, the question presented in Starker II was how
should the court of appeals apply collateral estoppel, pursuant to
the Montana test, to a fact situation originally controlled by the
Sunnen "separable facts test."
B. The Court of Appeals' Analysis
In analyzing the collateral estoppel issue in Starker, the court
examined the three pertinent questions involved in the determi-
nation of that issue. First, was the issue litigated by the parties?
Second, were the same or similar facts involved in the prior litiga-
tion? Finally, was the proponent of collateral estoppel a party to
the prior litigation? The following section will examine these
questions as applied in Starker, concluding with the possible im-
pact of the court's holding.
1. Litigation by the Parties
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Gov-
ernment was collaterally estopped from litigating the application
of section 1031 to T.J.'s transaction with Crown as to nine of the
twelve parcels due to the Starker I decision.5 2 In its analysis, the
court initially looked at the legal questions presented in both
Starker I and Starker II. In Starker I the Government argued
that no "exchange" took place because the reciprocal transfers
49. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
50. Id. at 161.
51. Id. at 159-60.
52. Three of the parcels, Timian, Bi-Mart and Booth, were sufficiently different
in several aspects from the properties litigated in Starker I to preclude the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel.
were not simultaneous and that Bruce and Elizabeth received
mere promises in consideration for their timberland. In Starker
II, instead of declaring that no exchange took place because of
the lack of simultaneous transfers, the Government contended
that if there was an "exchange," it was not an exchange of like
kind property because the exchange was not simultaneous and
because of the possibility of T.J. receiving cash instead of prop-
erty. Despite the change in the verbal formula, the Government's
argument was substantially the same in Starker I and I. In both
cases the Government argued that the Starkers received mere
promises and that section 1031 did not apply.
The court analyzed the collateral estoppel issue using the Ten-
tative Draft of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 53 Section
6 of the tentative draft enumerates four factors to be considered
by a court in deciding what issues were determined in a prior ac-
tion: (1) Was there a substantial overlap between the evidence or
argument advanced in the second proceeding and that advanced
in the first? (2) Does the new evidence or argument involve the
application of the same rule of law as that involved in the prior
proceeding? (3) Could pretrial preparation and discovery in the
first proceeding reasonably be expected to have embraced the
matter to be presented in the second? (4) How closely related are
the claims?
Several facts led the court to reject the Government's argument
that the legal questions in Starker I and II were severable. First,
the Government's argument in both Starker I and Starker II re-
lied on the same sentence and the same subsection of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.5 4 Second, the Government relied on the same
precedent and legislative history in both cases. 55 Finally, the
Government made the same point (the Starkers received mere
promises) and conclusion (section 1031 does not apply) in both
cases, with only the connecting arguments differing.56 The court
also pointed out that the Government did not argue the plain
meaning of "exchange" or "like kind" within the statutory lan-
guage,57 suggesting that had the Government emphasized the
meaning of "like kind" and "exchange," the emphasis of the
words in the two cases would have been relevant.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
54. 602 F.2d at 1345.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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2. Same or Similar Facts Test
The Government's second argument was that the facts in
Starker I were sufficiently "separable" from those in Starker II to
make collateral estoppel inapplicable. The court analyzed the
similarity of the facts under the new test set down in Montana v.
United States.5 8 Under the Montana test, collateral estoppel is
applicable even though some facts differ in the two cases. How-
ever, the facts that differ must not be "essential to the judgment"
or "of controlling significance" to the first case.59 It must be
pointed out, however, that Montana was decided prior to Starker
II and subsequent to Starker I. Prior to the Montana decision, a
collateral estoppel issue was analyzed under the Sunnen "separa-
ble facts" test.60 The "separable facts" test held that if the rele-
58. 440 U.S. 147 (1979). In Montana, a contractor brought suit against the State
of Montana contending that the Montana gross receipts tax unconstitutionally dis-
criminated against the United States and companies with which it dealt. This first
suit was financed and controlled by the United States. After the State of Montana
won the first case, the United States decided, as it did in Starker I, not to appeal.
The Court found that the United States' control of the first action put it in the
same position it would have occupied had it instituted both actions in its own
name.
In the contracts at issue in the Montana case, the contractors promised the
United States that they would not take advantage of credits offered by the state as
part of its tax package. In the contracts at issue in the second case, the contrac-
tors could take the state credits. The United States argued that in the first action
the state court assumed that the credits, available but for the voluntary contract
provision, could have entirely offset the tax. Under the later contracts, however,
even where the credits could have been taken, it turned out that a complete offset
was impossible. Therefore, citing Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), the
United States argued that its case should not have been dismissed. The United
States Supreme Court rejected this argument and limited Sunnen to cases where
there had been a significant "change in the legal climate." 440 U.S. at 158. The test
set out in Montana is that collateral estoppel will be applicable even though some
facts differ in the two cases at issue, if the differing facts are not "essential to the
judgment," or "of controlling significance" in the first case. 440 U.S. at 158.
59. 440 U.S. at 159-60.
60. 333 U.S. 591 (1948). In Sunnen, an inventor licensed his invention and as-
signed the licensed contracts and royalties to his wife. The issue was whether the
inventor was liable for taxes on the income paid to his wife by the licensee under
the contract in the years 1937 to 1941. In a previous litigation, the Board of Tax
Appeals (now the Tax Court) had held that for the years 1929 to 1931, the taxpayer
was not liable for payments made to his wife under a set of licenses entered into
in 1928. In the second case, both the 1928 contracts and other contracts were in-
volved.
The Court held that collateral estoppel was inapplicable under the separable
facts test:
[Ihf the relevant facts in the two cases are separable, even though they be
similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues
which recur in the second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve
vant facts in two cases are separable, even though they are
similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal
issues which recur in the second case. Thus, the second proceed-
ing may involve an instrument or transaction identical with, but
in a separable form from, the one dealt with in the first proceed-
ing.61 The Montana decision limited the "separable facts" test to
cases in which there had been a significant change in the legal cli-
mate. The Starker court held that it should apply the law that ex-
isted at the time the case was presented to the court.62 Thus, the
Montana test was deemed the applicable standard.
In Starker I, the court focused on the Starkers' reciprocal, yet
non-simultaneous, exchange with Crown. The opinion indicated
that the court did not consider the time span between transfers of
titles significant. Therefore, the Starker court held that "[ulnder
a fair reading of Starker I the length of time lapse is inconsequen-
tial"6 3 and thereby concluded that Starker II was not distinguish-
able on that ground. The Starker court also stated: "[Miany of
the transfers are identical to those in Starker I."64 Accordingly,
the Starker court held that collateral estoppel was applicable
under the Montana test, to the nine parcels where T.J. received
actual title. The court's determination of the Timian, Bi-Mart and
Booth properties, where collateral estoppel was held inapplicable,
will be addressed later in this note.65
3. Party to the Prior Litigation
Even though T.J. was not a party to Starker I, he sought to use
that victory "offensively" to prevent the Government from reliti-
gating the simultaneous transfer issue. The court of appeals held
that collateral estoppel was applicable, because the Government,
an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from,
the one dealt with in the first proceeding. In that situation, a court is free
in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the le-
gal matters at issue. . . .Before a party can invoke the collateral estoppel
doctrine in these circumstances, the legal matter raised in the second pro-
ceeding must involve the same set of events or documents and the same
bundle of legal principles that contributed to the rendering of the first
judgment.
333 U.S. at 601-02 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 602.
62. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 76-77 (1975) (the Court held that a court
should apply the law as it exists at the time the case is before the court). See also
United States v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 592 F.2d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1979) (a
court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing
so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction of legislative
history to the contrary (citing Ash, 422 U.S. at 76-77)).
63. 602 F.2d at 1348.
64. Starker v. United States, 432 F. Supp. at 867.
65. See notes 72-141 infra, and accompanying text.
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which was a party to the prior case, had a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate the issue in Starker I. Because of the $31,342 re-
fund at stake in Starker I, the Government had sufficient
incentive to litigate. The court declined to speculate on T.J.'s mo-
tives for not joining in Starker I, finding that T.J. had not engaged
in a "wait-and-see" gamble to elude the binding force of the
Starker I judgment. 66
C. Impact of the Court's Holding as to Collateral Estoppel
The court's holding, regarding the first nine parcels, clearly
shows that the Montana test should be utilized when analyzing
the facts of two cases to determine whether collateral estoppel
applies. This is important in that Montana limits Sunnen's "sepa-
rable facts" test to a rather narrow factual situation.67 Pursuant
to the Montana test, courts now have broader discretion in deter-
mining when to apply collateral estoppel.68 This is of great impor-
tance to the practitioner because it permits greater usage of
collateral estoppel, both defensively and offensively. However, it
should be pointed out that when proceeding with collateral estop-
pel offensively, the courts, in their broad discretion, will not per-
mit collateral estoppel where a party could have easily joined in
an earlier action, or where the application of offensive estoppel
would be unfair to the defendant. 69
A word of caution is due concerning the use of collateral estop-
pel pursuant to the Starker analysis. The court in Starker found
that T.J. had not taken a "wait-and-see" approach in the hope the
prior action (Starker I) would result in a favorable judgment.70
This is important, because under the Montana test the burden on
the proponent of collateral estoppel has been removed with re-
66. 602 F.2d at 1349-50. The court stated T.J. should be allowed to use collat-
eral estoppel, although pursuant to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
he technically would have to be joined as a party to the first suit. "The father's
suit differs from that of his son in so many respects, however, that there are nu-
merous possible explanations why T.J. Starker-or for that matter, Bruce and
Elizabeth Starker-might have wanted the lawsuits tried separately." Id. at 1349
(footnote omitted).
67. See note 58 supra, and accompanying text.
68. See Jackson v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1979). The court stated:
"[C]ourts are no longer bound by rigid definitions of the parties or their privies for
the purposes of applying collateral estoppel or res judicata." Id. at 1126 (citing
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979)).
69. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979).
70. 602 F.2d at 1349.
spect to the separable facts test: however, courts will not tolerate
a "wait-and-see" approach, in the application of collateral estop-
pel, where it is the intent of the litigant to elude the binding force
of a prior judgment.7 1
At this juncture it is appropriate to examine the Starker court's
section 1031 analysis of the three properties that the Government
was not collaterally estopped from litigating. This examination
will be preceded by a brief history of section 1031 and the progres-
sion of the permissible nonsimultaneous exchange.
IV. LIKE KIND EXCHANGES
A. History
1. The Concept of Like Kind Exchanges
The first statutory acknowledgment that certain gains on ex-
changes of property would not be recognized for tax purposes was
in the Revenue Act of 1921, section 202(c).7 2 That section pro-
vided that no gain or loss would be recognized from exchanges of
property unless the replacement property had a readily realizable
market value. However, more important was another provision in
the section that provided nonrecognition treatment for the ex-
change of property held for investment or productive use in trade
or business. 73 In 1928, some relatively minor revisions were
made,7 4 leaving the current section 1031(a) substantially
equivalent to the 1928 version.
The purpose of section 1031 and its predecessors, is to defer rec-
ognition of transactions where the taxpayer may have realized a
gain or loss, but that gain or loss was still in investment form and
the taxpayer was substantially in the same economic position (in
71. Id. at 1349-50.
72. The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1031) states in part:
(c) For purposes of this title, on an exchange of property, real,
personal, or mixed, for any other such property, no gain or loss
shall be recognized unless the property received in the exchange
has a readily realizable market value; but even if the property re-
ceived in exchange has a readily realizable market value, no gain
or loss shall be recognized ... when any such property held for
investment, or for productive use in trade or business... is ex-
changed for property of like kind or use.
73. Id. The House Committee, commenting on the above 1921 statute, noted:
The proposed bill. . . [provides] that on an exchange of property
no gain or loss shall be recognized unless the property received in
exchange has a definite and readily realizable market value; and
specifies in addition certain classes of exchanges on which no gain
or loss is recognized even if the property received has a readily
realizable market value.
Id.
74. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(b), 45 Stat. 816, (now I.R.C. § 1031).
IVol. 8: 223, 1980] The New Starker
PEPPERINE LAW REVIEW
the sense of liquidity) after the transaction as he was prior to it.
This so-called "continuity of investment" rationale serves as the
primary justification behind the section.7 5
The transaction involved in Starker is a variation of the so-
called "three-corner" exchange. In such a transaction, the tax-
payer desires to exchange, rather than to sell his property out-
right. However, the potential buyer of the taxpayer's property
owns no property that the taxpayer wishes to receive in the ex-
change. Therefore, the buyer purchases other suitable property
from a third party, and then exchanges it for the property held by
the taxpayer.76
Several cases prior to Starker held the "three-corner" exchange
to be an exchange eligible for nonrecognition treatment within
75. See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). This report, cited in
Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940), recognized that the
"continuity of investment" rationale was the main justification behind the section.
Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Century Elec. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952), indicated later
that the main justification for the statute was in alleviating the administrative
problems which occurred with the valuation of gain or loss in like kind transac-
tions.
Subsections 112(b)(1) and 112(e) indicate the controlling policy and pur-
pose of the section, that is, the non-recognition of gain or loss in transac-
tions where neither is measured in terms of money, where in theory the
taxpayer may have realized gain or loss but where in fact his economic
situation is the same after as it was before the transaction.
192 F.2d at 159.
76. A three-corner exchange can be illustrated as follows:
3.
TAXPAY 4. BUYER
/ 2.
[THIRD PARTY
1
TITLE - CASH ...
(1) Buyer purchases suitable property to be exchanged with Taxpayer; often the
property is designated by the Taxpayer; (2) Third Party transfers title to Buyer; (3
and 4) Taxpayer transfers title of his property to Buyer, and Buyer transfers ex-
change property to Taxpayer. Normally, before Starker, this was viewed as a si-
multaneous exchange of titles.
the meaning of section 1031. 7 7 In so holding, the courts permitted
taxpayers great latitude in structuring transactions. 78 It is imma-
terial that an exchange is motivated by a wish to reduce or defer
taxes. 79 The taxpayer may locate suitable property to be received
in an exchange and may participate in the negotiations between
the buyer and a third party for the acquisition of such property. 80
This is important because the Internal Revenue Service often ar-
gues that a taxpayer, who is active in the negotiations between
the third party and the buyer for the exchange property, has con-
structively received payment from the buyer to purchase the
property from the third party directly. This construction, if ac-
cepted, would be fatal to the taxpayer's attempt to have nonrecog-
nition treatment of the transaction. However, under liberal
construction by the courts, it appears that the final result, not the
intermediate transactions and negotiations of a like kind ex-
change, is the determinative factor for which the transaction will
qualify for nonrecognition under section 1031.81
2. Growth of the Permissible Nonsimultaneous Exchange
One of the first cases presenting the issue of simultaneous ex-
change was Home v. Commissioner.82 In Home, the taxpayer
77. See, e.g., Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 38
T.C. 215 (1962). The party entered into escrow with no intention to sell for cash if
it could be exchanged for other realty of like kind. The court held there was a
valid § 1031 exchange and nonrecognition treatment. In W.D. Haden Co. v. Com-
missioner, 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948), there was an exchange with buyer purchas-
ing real estate from a third party to exchange with the taxpayer. The court held
there was a valid exchange and nonrecognition treatment was appropriate. In
Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394 (1969), there was an exchange of farm and res-
idence for property, cash and a note. The court held this a valid § 1031 exchange,
and accordingly, there was nonrecognition treatment.
78. See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.
79. See Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore Trustees v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A.
82 (1935). The court pointed out that the trustees could have sold the property or
effected a tax-deferred exchange. The court also noted the fact that their motive
for exchanging the property was to defer taxes. This however, did not invalidate
an otherwise valid tax-deferred exchange. 32 B.T.A. at 87.
80. See, e.g., Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333, 338 (4th Cir.
1963). Here, the taxpayer exchanged property with the oil company after negotiat-
ing with a third party to sell or exchange the property to the oil company. The
court found a valid § 1031 exchange. In Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790,
793 (1963), the taxpayers entered into an agreement to sell a farm to the buyer, but
the taxpayers intended to exchange property and to only take cash if an exchange
could not be made. The exchange in fact took place after the taxpayer located a
buyer. The buyer then purchased the property and exchanged it with the tax-
payer for the exchange property. The court deemed it a valid § 1031 exchange. In
Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. at 397-98, an agent of the taxpayer located an op-
tion for the purchase of a farm. This was purchased by the buyer and exchanged
to taxpayer and was held a valid § 1031 exchange.
81. See note 80 supra.
82. 5 T.C. 250 (1945).
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purchases a membership in the New York Coffee and Sugar Ex-
change, Inc. from one party. Nine days later the taxpayer sold a
different membership in the same exchange to a different party.
The taxpayer sought to claim a loss deduction on the sale of his
membership certificate. The Commissioner contested the loss de-
duction, contending that the taxpayer qualified for tax-deferred
exchange treatment. Although the sales took place nine days
apart, the Tax Court held the transaction to constitute a tax-de-
ferred exchange. Accordingly, because of the mandatory nature
of section 1031, the taxpayer was precluded from deducting his
loss. 8 3
In 1962, the Tax Court applied section 1031 to 'another non-
simultaneous exchange, although without designating it as such.
In J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,84 the taxpayer
agreed to transfer his property in exchange for raw land, which
wag to be improved later according to the taxpayer's specifica-
tions. The taxpayer transferred his property on October 31, 1956,
but retained use of the property rent-free for nine months, until
the improvements on the exchange property were completed.
When such improvements were completed, on July 19, 1957, the ti-
tle to the exchange property was transferred to the taxpayer, and
taxpayer relinquished the rent-free use of the property.
The Commissioner argued that the transaction did not qualify
for tax-deferred exchange treatment, inasmuch as the taxpayer
did not receive title to the exchange property until nine months
after the transfer of title to the buyer. The Tax Court found for
the taxpayer by concluding that there had been a simultaneous
exchange on July 19, 1957. The court reasoned that on that date
the taxpayer exchanged equitable title to its property for the legal
title to the exchange property.85 The court cited no authority for
the contention that rent-free use of property is the equivalent to
"equitable title." Therefore, the court effectively sanctioned a
nonsimultaneous exchange to be treated as a simultaneous ex-
change, which granted the taxpayer the desired result: nonrecog-
nition treatment.
83. Id. at 256. Section 1031(a) is not an elective provision. If the transaction
qualifies under the section, the nonrecognition treatment is mandatory. Note the
pertinent language of the provision: "No gain or loss shall be recognized .
I.R.C. § 1031(a) (emphasis added).
84. 39 T.C. 608 (1962), acq., 1963-2 C.B. 4.
85. 39 T.C. at 618.
Probably the most important case concerning nonsimultaneous
exchanges, prior to the Starker decisions, was Red Wing Carriers,
Inc. v. Tomlinson.86 In Red Wing, the taxpayer attempted to
structure a trade of old trucks for new trucks as a sale and
purchase by delaying the time of each transaction. Under this
setup, the taxpayer hoped to claim a depreciation deduction.
However, the Commission contended that the transfers took place
"[a] t or about the same time,' ' 87 and therefore, constituted a like
kind exchange under section 1031. The court held that the ex-
change could not be transformed into a sale and purchase by an
arbitrary separation of the time for the exchange of cash.88 The
court, thereby, approved nonrecognition treatment and denied the
deduction.
In a more recent case, Rutherford v. Commissioner,89 a taxpayer
sought an investment tax credit and a depreciation deduction on
the transfer of heifers, with an agreement to deliver to the ex-
change party certain offspring born to the heifers. The time span
between the original transfer of the cattle and the transfer back of
their offpring took as long as three years. Despite this substantial
period of time, the Tax Court held that section 1031 applied, and
therefore, barred the taxpayer's recognition of his loss and deduc-
tion.
The fact that the heifers, to be delivered by the taxpayer, were
not in existence at the time of the transfer of the exchange prop-
erty did not preclude the application of section 1031.90
These cases set the stage for Starker, where the taxpayer (T.J.)
contended that the mere nonsimultaneity of transfer should not
preclude a finding of a qualifying exchange under section 1031.
B. Court of Appeals' Analysis of the Section 1031 Issue
Three properties exchanged to T.J. did not come within the pa-
rameters of collateral estoppel. They include the Timian, Bi-Mart
and Booth properties. Only the Booth property will be discussed
herein.9 1
86. 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968).
87. Id. at 655.
88. Id. at 658.
89. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-77 (1978).
90. The court cited Coastal Terminals, supra note 78, and Biggs v. Commis-
sioner, 69 T.C. 905, 916 (1978), for the proposition that a section 1031 exchange took
place despite the lack of actual simultaneous transfers of title between the parties.
91. The court held that neither the Timian nor the Bi-Mart property qualified
under section 1031 because titles to neither property were actually transferred to
T.J. Starker. Rather, both were transferred directly to T.J.'s daughter Jean Roth.
The court of appeals concluded that section 1031 required continuity of title and
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1. Like Kind Determination of Booth Property
The most important aspect of Starker is the court of appeals'
holding regarding the Booth property. The Booth property was
commercial property, of which Crown purchased a third party's
contract right to purchase. Crown then assigned this right to T.J.
Starker. Title would not pass, pursuant to the agreement, until an
existing life estate expired. In the meantime, the holders of the
contract to purchase were entitled to possession of the property
subject to certain restrictions. For instance, the purchasers were
prohibited from removing improvements and were required to
keep buildings and fences in good repair. The court also stated:
"[A] substantial portion of the purchase price must be invested,
with a fixed return to be paid to the purchaser of the life inter-
est."92 If any of these conditions were broken, the agreement pro-
vided that the seller could, at his election, rescind the contract.
The court held that despite these contingencies, T.J. received
what was equivalent to a fee interest for purposes of section 1031.
The court cited Treasury Regulation section 1.1031(a)-1(c), 93
under which a leasehold interest of thirty years or more is the
equivalent of a fee interest for purposes of determining whether
the properties exchanged are of like kind. The court stated that
the interest received by T.J. was at least equivalent to the rights
of a long-term lessee, plus an equitable fee subject to conditions
precedent. 94 Thus, even though the Government argued that T.J.
received personal property in the form of a contract right to
purchase, the court held that for purposes of section 1031, the con-
tract right to purchase was like kind property and hence, eligible
for nonrecognition treatment.95
The second issue concerning the Booth property was whether
simultaneous transfer was required for nonrecognition treatment
since T.J. never was actually vested in title to either the Bi-Mart or Timian proper-
ties, they would not qualify for nonrecognition treatment. 602 F.2d at 1350-51.
The Timian property was subsequently used by T.J. as his personal residence
which would also disqualify it for nonrecognition treatment, since it was not held
for "investment or business purpose." Id. See I.R.C. § 1031(a).
92. 602 F.2d at 1351.
93. Treas. Regs. § 1. 1031(a)-l(c)(a) provides that no gain or loss is recognized
if "[a I taxpayer who is not a dealer in real estate exchanges city real estate for a
ranch or farm, or exchanges a leasehold of a fee with 30 years or more to run for
real estate, or exchanges improved for unimproved real estate ......
94. 602 F.2d at 1351.
95. Id. at 1352.
under section 1031. The facts indicated that T.J. did not receive
the fee equivalent to the Booth property at the time he conveyed
his property to Crown. The Government contended that under
Treasury Regulation section 1.1002-(1) (b),96 all exceptions to the
general rule that gain and losses are recognized must be con-
strued narrowly.97 In other words, the exchange must satisfy the
underlying purpose for which exchanges are allowed nonrecogni-
tion treatment. 98
However, the court concluded that the underlying purpose of
section 1031 was not altogether clear.99 The main reason behind
section 1031 appeared to be that Congress was sympathetic to tax-
payers who exchanged their property and who did not have the
necessary cash to pay a capital gains tax when the exchange
96. Treas. Regs. § 1. 1002-(1) (b) provide in pertinent part:
The exceptions from the general rule requiring the recognition of
all gains and losses, like other exceptions from a rule of taxation
of general and uniform application, are strictly construed and do
not extend either beyond the words or underlying assumptions
and purposes of the exception. Non-recognition is accorded by
the Code only if the exchange is one which satisfies both (1) the
specific description in the Code of an excepted exchange, and (2)
the underlying purpose for which such exchange is excepted from
the general rule ...
97. 602 F.2d at 1352.
98. The court remarked:
The legislative history reveals that the provision [section 1031]
was designed to avoid the imposition of a tax on those who do not
'cash in' on their investments in trade or business property. Con-
gress appeared to be concerned that the taxpayer would not have
the cash to pay the tax on the capital gain .... [TJhis does not
explain the precise limits of section 1031, however; if those tax-
payers sell their property for cash and reinvest that cash in like-
kind property, they cannot enjoy the section's benefits, even if re-
investment takes place just a few days after the sale....
Id.
See note 73 supra, and accompanying text. The court's remarks concerning the
legislative purpose of section 1031 make an excellent point for an amendment to
section 1031. That point concerns the inequity that occurs when a taxpayer sells
his property held for business or investment purposes and reinvests thereafter in
like kind property. Although, immediately subsequent to the sale of his property,
the taxpayer may be in a sufficiently liquid state to pay the ensuing tax; after he
repurchases business property, he is in substantially the same position as the ex-
change taxpayer in respect to liquidity. One suggestion is that section 1031 be
amended to include a "rollover" provision. This is simply a deferral of tax realized
on gain up to the amount reinvested, as long as the party reinvests within a statu-
tory time limit, for instance, an eighteen-month period. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1033-34.
Other commentators have expressed general approval of this position. See Com-
ment, Section 1031 Exchanges. Step Transaction Analysis and the Need for Legis-
lative Amendment, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 351 (1976); West and Chodrow, New Case
Points Up Planning Techniques in Tax-Free Exchanges of Real Estate, 20 J. TAX.
52 (1964); Kantor, Section 1031 Exchange of Like Kind Property: A Court in
Trouble, 22 Sw. L.J. 517 (1968).
99. See note 98 supra, and accompanying text.
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caused gain recognition.10o This "liquidity" rationale, the court
observed, was limited due to the fact that if a taxpayer sold his
business property, and reinvested the proceeds of that sale in a
like kind property, he would still have to pay tax on the gain al-
though he would be in the same position as the exchange tax-
payer with respect to liquidity. The inequity of this result is
unquestioned.
The court believed the drafters of section 1031 had also consid-
ered the difficulty of gain or loss valuation of exchanged prop-
erty.10 1 Under section 1031(d), the taxpayer is allowed to transfer
the basis of the property he exchanges to the property he re-
ceives.'0 2 Actually this only defers the valuation problem as well
as the tax, until the exchanged property is disposed of in a man-
ner in which gain or loss is recognized. This valuation rationale is
also limited, because where exchanges take place between
properties not of like kind, there is an equally difficult valuation
of gain or loss. 0 3 Therefore, it appears that the underlying pur-
pose of section 1031 is to prevent the inequity of forcing the tax-
payer to recognize a paper gain or loss, 104 along with the
realization that although there may have been a gain or loss in
one sense, there was in the popular and economic sense a mere
100. 602 F.2d at 1352.
101. Id.
102. I.R.C. § 1031(d). The statute provides in pertinent part:
If property was acquired on an exchange described in this section ...
then the basis shall be the same as that of the property exchanged, de-
creased in the amount of any money received by the taxpayer and in-
creased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss to the
taxpayer that was recognized on such exchange.
103. The court stated with regard to the valuation rationale:
[S]o long as a single dollar in cash or other non-like-kind property
("boot") is received by the taxpayer along with like-kind property, valua-
tion of both properties in the exchange becomes necessary. In that case,
the taxpayer is liable for the gain realized, with the maximum liability be-
ing on the amount of cash or other "boot" received .... To compute the
gain realized, one must place a value on the like-kind property received.
Moreover, the nonrecognition provision applies only to like-kind ex-
changes, and not to other exchanges in which valuation is just as diffi-
cult. ...
602 F.2d at 1352.
104. See Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959). The
Marsh court held that the purpose of a simultaneous like kind exchange was to
defer the recognition of gain or loss when property held for use in trade or busi-
ness, or for investment, is exchanged solely for property of like kind so as to pre-
vent the inequity of forcing the taxpayer to recognize a paper gain which was still
tied up in a continuing investment of the same sort.
change in the form of ownership. 0 5
Another reason the court believed Treasury Regulations section
1.1002-1 would be inappropriate, if applied to section 1031 in this
case, is the long line of precedent liberally construing the sec-
tion.10 6 The court cited Biggs v. Commissioner, 0 7 which held that
a "four-corner"o8 exchange qualified for section 1031 nonrecogni-
tion treatment. In Biggs, the second party (buyer) did not want
to take title to the property that the taxpayer (first party) ulti-
mately desired. As a result, the taxpayer advanced money to a
syndicate, which purchased the desired property from a fourth
party and transferred it to the taxpayer.'0 9 The taxpayer then
105. See Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1943),
reh. denied, 148 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1943).
106. See, e.g., Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 913 (1978), where the court
stated:
In numerous cases, this type of transaction has been held to constitute an
exchange within the meaning of section 1031. E.g., Alderson v. Commis-
sioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963) rev'g, 38 T.C. 215 (1962) .... In so
holding, the courts have permitted taxpayers great latitude in structuring
transactions. Thus, it is immaterial that the exchange was motivated by a
wish to reduce taxes. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, et al., Trustees v.
Commissioner, [32 B.T.A. 87, 88 (1935)]. The taxpayer can locate suitable
property to be received in exchange and can enter into negotiations for ac-
quisition of such property. Coast Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d
333, 338 (4th Cir. 1963); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d at 793; Coupe v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. at 397-98 (1969).
69 T.C. at 913 (citations omitted).
107. 69 T.C. 905 (1978).
108. See note 102 supra, and accompanying text.
109. In order to give the reader a better grasp of the "four-corner" exchange, as
exemplified in Biggs, the following illustration is offered:
TAXPAYER BUYER~~II
l1 4 76I I _ _ _ _ _
SYNDICATE FOURTH PARTY
2
CASH TITLE-
(1) Taxpayer transfers cash to purchase the exchange property to a Syndicate set
up to complete the transaction; (2) Syndicate purchases exchange property from
the Fourth Party; (3) Fourth Party transfers property to Syndicate; (4) Syndicate
transfers exchange property to Taxpayer; (5) Taxpayer transfers his original prop-
erty to Second Party; (6) Second party reimburses Syndicate amount paid for the
exchange property; and (7) Syndicate reimburses Taxpayer amount put into Syn-
dicate by Taxpayer. For a definition of terms used in this illustration, see note 2
supra, and accompanying text.
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transferred his original property to a second party, and received
back his cash advance to the syndicate, which ultimately came
out of the pocket of the second party. The Tax Court found that
the criteria for the application of section 1031, which included an
exchange of property held for productive use in trade, business,
or for investment for like kind property to be held for productive
use in trade, business, or for investment, had been satisfied, since
all the various transfers were part of an overall plan that ex-
changed like kind properties between the taxpayer and the sec-
ond party. It should also be pointed out that since the third party
(syndicate) realized no gain on the transaction, no tax was levied.
But, in contrast, the fourth party, who sold his property to the
syndicate, and ultimately exchanged to the taxpayer, did realize a
gain on the sale of his property. Therefore, the fourth party was
liable for tax on that gain." 0
With the liberal construction given section 1031, the court ana-
lyzed two features of the Booth transaction most likely to trigger
the recognition of gain. The first feature was the possibility of T.J.
receiving cash in the transaction. As pointed out in the facts, one
of the provisions of the exchange agreement between Crown and
T.J. was that if suitable property could not be located to effectuate
the exchange within five years, then the balance of the T.J. ac-
count on Crown's books would be paid in cash. The court relied
upon Alderson v. Commissioner,"' which held that the mere pos-
sibility of receiving cash would not disqualify an otherwise quali-
fied exchange under section 1031, where, from the outset, the
intent of the parties was to exchange like kind property and, in
fact, the exchange had taken place.112 This holding was in accord
110. See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (repealed by act of Oct. 4,1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Title
XIX, § 1901(b) 28(B)(i), 90 Stat. 1799) which provided: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this subtitle, on the sale or exchange of property, the entire amount of the
gain or loss . . . [realized] shall be recognized."
111. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963). See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.
112. 317 F.2d at 793. In Alderson, the taxpayer signed an agreement to sell his
property. However, it was the taxpayer's intent to exchange properties if suitable
properties could be located. Escrow was entered to sell taxpayer's property for
cash. However, before escrow was closed, suitable like kind property was located.
The escrow was amended to provide that the buyer would acquire the described
realty and exchange it for taxpayer's realty. The court held that the exchange
qualified for section 1031 treatment. "IT]rue, the intermediate acts of the parties
could have been closer to and have more precisely depicted the ultimate desired
result, but what actually occurred. . . was an exchange of deeds between... [the
parties] which [qualified as an exchange under section 1031] .. " Id.
with Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Commissioner,13 which
allowed the taxpayer to receive nonrecognition treatment by vir-
tue of its intention to exchange properties, rather than receive
cash, if an exchange could be arranged to the satisfaction of the
parties. Since T.J. never received any cash and because his inten-
tion was to exchange like kind properties and because like kind
properties were exchanged, the court held Alderson was control-
ling.114 Thus, section 1031 was applicable to the Booth property
transaction.
However, the Government contended that the Starker II trans-
action was distinguishable from Alderson. The Government
pointed out that in Alderson, although there had been a possibil-
ity of receiving cash at the time of the exchange agreement, there
was no possibility of receiving cash at the time the taxpayer
transferred his property pursuant to the argument.115 However,
the court did not find this distinction to be of importance.
2. Simultaneous Transfer
In the previously discussed Red Wingl"6 case, the Government
argued that the mutual transfer of trucks occurring "at or about"
the same time was, in fact, an exchange under section 1031.117 In
Red Wing, a taxpayer attempted to deduct a loss on the deprecia-
113. 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935). See note 76 supra, and accompanying text.
114. The intention of the parties is important in analyzing whether or not the
transaction will qualify under section 1031. See Carlton v. United States, 255 F.
Supp. 812 (S.D. Fla. 1966). Carlton involved a transaction whereby the taxpayers,
who had given an option on their ranch property, negotiated to acquire other
ranch property. They intended to make a tax-free exchange, in which the optionee
contracted to buy other property and assigned the contract to the taxpayers at the
time of sale of the taxpayer's ranch. The court held that this did not qualify as a
tax-free exchange, since title never vested in the optionee. In discussing the im-
port of the intent of the parties, the court also pointed out "intentions alone are
not enough. It is what is done; not what might have been done that controls." Id.
at 817 (citing Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126, 136 (1965)). However, the court
in Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 560, (E.D.S.C. 1962), affd,
320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1962), held that a transaction by which property is exchanged
solely for property of like kind cannot, for tax purposes, be separated into its com-
ponent parts in order to accomplish the exchange. The actual intention of the par-
ties and the accomplished transaction, rather than the separate intermediate
steps, govern. Id. at 562. Contra, Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255 (N.D.
Ga. 1968).
However, the most important fact in determining whether the transaction will
qualify for nonrecognition treatment is the substance of the transaction. See Red
Wing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968). The Red Wing court
stated that taxation is transactional, not cuneiform, and tax laws are not so supple
that scraps of paper, regardless of their calligraphy, can transmit trade-ins into
sales. Id. at 659.
115. 602 F.2d at 1354.
116. 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968). See notes 80, 81 supra, and accompanying text.
117. 399 F.2d at 655.
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tion of its old trucks exchanged for new trucks. The parent corpo-
ration transferred its old trucks to a subsidiary and purchased
new trucks for cash from a dealer. The subsidiary sold the old
trucks to the same dealer for cash. The court of appeals disal-
lowed the loss deduction under section 1031. That court viewed
the transaction as a whole, and despite the obvious lack of simul-
taneous transfers, held that the transaction qualified under sec-
tion 1031.118 The court also stated that "[tihe buying and selling
[of the trucks] were synchronous parts meshed into the same
transaction and not independent transactions."'1 9 This statement
shows that the court was clearly more concerned about the sub-
stance of the transaction than the form of the transaction.120
In Starker the Government contended that Red Wing was dis-
tinguishable in that the Starker transfers were separated by a
"substantial" period of time.121 The court declined to make such a
distinction, but offered no analysis to support the holding.122
It is important to note here that the Commissioner apparently
tolerated the lack of simultaneous transfer in Red Wing, where it
was to the Government's advantage to do so. In Red Wing, the
taxpayer separated the disposal of the old trucks by a period of
time so that section 1031 would not be applicable. By doing so,
the taxpayer hoped to deduct the loss on the transaction. 123 By
piercing the form of the Red Wing transaction, and thereby put-
ting it within section 1031, the Commissioner saved the Govern-
ment $66,630.33.124
However, as evident in Starker, the court is apparently not go-
118. Id. See note 87 supra, and accompanying text.
119. 399 F.2d at 656.
120. The fifth circuit in Red Wing also stated: "[T]he courts may open the shell
and look inside to determine the substance of the transaction." 399 F.2d at 657.
See generally Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (the in-
cidence of taxation depends upon the substance of the transaction); Helvering v.
Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (in the field of taxation, the courts are concerned
with the realities and substance of the transaction); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465, 469 (1935) (the court will look through mere disguises and find the real charac-
ter of a transaction). See also Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 207 F.
Supp. 560, 562 (E.D.S.C. 1962), affd, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963), where this rule
was applied in a section 1031 case.
121. 602 F.2d at 1355.
122. Id. In fact the court, in addressing the issue of the "substantial" period of
time separating the transactions involved in Starker, declined to draw a line be-
tween the differing time periods. Id.
123. 399 F.2d at 654.
124. Id.
ing to allow the Internal Revenue Service to argue successfully in
one instance, that there can be a valid section 1031 exchange de-
spite the lack of simultaneous transfers of title, as in Red Wing,
and in the next instance, argue that there cannot be a valid sec-
tion 1031 exchange unless there are simultaneous transfers of ti-
tle, as in Starker. In other words, the court is requiring the
Internal Revenue Service to be consistent with respect to its
treatment of nonsimultaneous exchanges by declining to make
the distinction in Starker that the transactions were separated by
a "substantial" period of time.
This holding clearly opens a new door concerning the applica-
bility of section 1031, and perhaps more importantly, it offers a
pragmatic approach in analyzing section 1031 exchanges. That ap-
proach is to consider the purposes of the statute and to analyze
its application to the particular facts of the case under existing
precedent.125 Pursuant to this approach, the court found that the
purpose of the statute was to defer the recognition of gain or loss
in the transaction where the taxpayer did not "cash in" or "close
out" his investment. The court stated:
To impose a tax on the event of a deed transfer upon a signing of an ex-
change agreement could bring about the very result section 1031 was
designed to prevent: '[TIhe inequity . . .of forcing a taxpayer to recog-
nize a paper gain which is still tied up in a continuing investment of the
same sort.
1 2 6
This point is well taken by the court in that if T.J. was required to
recognize the gain in his transaction with Crown, he would have
to recognize a paper gain because he realized no cash in the
transaction with Crown.
3. Chose in Action Argument
The Government next argued that the contract to purchase the
Booth property was merely a chose in action127 and precluded
from nonrecognition treatment under section 1031.128 The court
agreed with the Government that the contract was a chose in ac-
tion, but held that it qualified for nonrecognition treatment de-
spite the statutory language of section 1031.129 The court's
rationale was that "title" to real property, like a contract right to
purchase property, is nothing more than a "bundle of potential
125. 602 F.2d at 1355.
126. Id. (citing Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir.
1959)).
127. 602 F.2d at 1355-56.
128. I.R.C. § 1031(a) states in pertinent part: "no gain or loss shall be recog-
nized if property [is] held for productive use in trade or business or for invest-
ment (not including stock in trade or ... choses in action .... )" (emphasis
added).
129. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
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causes of action: for trespass, to quiet title, for interference with
quiet enjoyment, and so on."'130 Since the bundle of rights associ-
ated with ownership is not precluded under section 1031, the
court believed that the contractual rights to assume such owner-
ship should not be precluded either. The court stated:
Even if the contract right includes the possibility of the taxpayer receiving
something other than ownership of like-kind property, we hold that it is
still of like-kind with ownership for tax purposes when the taxpayer pre-
fers property to cash before and throughout the executory period, and
only like-kind property is ultimately received.
13 1
This statement clearly shows that the court was more concerned
with the realities of the transaction rather than mere speculation
of what possibly could have transpired. T.J. did transfer his prop-
erty to Crown and, in return, received title, or a contract right
equivalent to title for section 1031 purposes. T.J. received no cash
in the transaction and thus section 1031 was rightly and justly ap-
plied to his exchange with Crown. Under this rationale, the court
held that the Booth property qualified for like kind treatment and
nonrecognition of gain under section 1031.
The final issue the court addressed was the growth factor. 3 2
The Government argued and the court agreed that the growth fac-
tor incorporated into the exchange agreement was merely dis-
guised interest and taxable as ordinary income.133
130. 602 F.2d at 1355.
'131. Id.
132. T.J. and Crown had a provision in their exchange agreement whereby a six
percent growth factor would be credited to T.J.'s account annually, for the growth
of the timber. The Government contended that the growth factor on the timber
was merely disguised interest and therefore taxable as ordinary gain.
133. T.J. contended that the six percent growth provision merely compensated
him for the timber growth on the property he transferred to Crown. The provision
would do so, from the time of the transfer, until his credit balance was extin-
guished.
The court, while recognizing that T.J.'s argument was not without some biologi-
cal merit, held that because T.J. bore no risk of loss after he conveyed title to
Crown, the six percent growth factor was merely "compensation for the forbear-
ance of money" and therefore, was disguised interest. The court stated: "Starker
and Crown, as sophisticated managers of timberland, presumably knew about fire,
blowdown, bugkill, government regulations, and other risks that ordinarily pass
with title unless otherwise allocated in transactions spread over time." 602 F.2d at
1356 n.13. The court's holding is flexible in that it does not preclude a growth fac-
tor from being categorized as a capital asset. But, it does require the parties to
document their intent, and for the growth factor to be treated as a capital asset
and to, therefore, receive capital gain treatment, the documentation must show
that the party claiming the capital gain also bore the risk of loss to that capital
gain. See United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965). "Earned original
issue discount serves the same function as stated interest, concedely ordinary in-
C. Impact of Section 1031 Discussion
The issue remains open concerning what length of time would
be tolerated between transfers of title in order to qualify as a si-
multaneous exchange under section 1031. The terms of T.J.'s con-
tract allowed up to five years to make the exchange, although the
actual period was only two years. Whether or not the period
could have been five, ten, or fifteen years was left unanswered. 134
This question should be answered by Congress.135
Starker should have far-reaching effects on the real estate in-
vestment market. One of the major difficulties in effecting tax-de-
ferred exchanges has been the complexity of arranging a
simultaneous exchange of titles.136 With this artificial time con-
straint (simultaneous exchange of titles) removed, taxpayers will
be more able to market their properties with a greater possibility
of finding suitable exchange property. This will increase the in-
centive for many investors to exchange property otherwise un-
marketable because of the difficulty of arranging a suitable
exchange or the unbearable tax burden if sold for cash. When the
only alternative is a sale (without the benefits of deferring taxes),
the delayed exchange adds flexibility where there once was none.
However, the practitioner should be aware that it is generally
not advisable for a taxpayer to transfer his property to the buyer
without some guarantees that the buyer will be able and willing
to purchase and transfer the designated property to the tax-
payer.137 One method in which the taxpayer can protect himself
is to take, as security, a deed of trust against the taxpayer's for-
come and a net capital asset; it is simply the compensation for the forbearance of
money." Id. at 57; Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1939). In the business world,
"interest on indebtedness" means compensation for the forbearance of money. Id.
at 498.
134. In addressing the issue of what length of time between exchanges of title,
a taxpayer would be allowed while still receiving tax-deferred treatment, the court
stated:
Some administrative difficulties may surface as a result [of our decision
leaving the treatment of an alleged exchange open until the receipt of con-
sideration by the taxpayer]. Our role, however, is not necessarily to facili-
tate administration. It is to devine [sic] the meaning of the statute in a
manner as consistent as possible with the intent of Congress and the prior
holdings of the courts. If our holding today adds a degree of uncertainty
to this area, Congress can clarify its meaning.
602 F.2d at 1356.
135. See note 98 supra, and accompanying text.
136. See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
137. It should be noted that T.J. put his faith in the solvency of Crown to make
the necessary acquisitions over the five year period without the benefit of security.
It must be pointed out that T.J. was undoubtedly aware of Crown's outstanding
credit rating. Standard & Poor's rating service rated the Crown 4ellerbach Corpo-
ration as A-, indicating an excellent credit rating. STANDARD & POOR'S CORP.
STOCK REPORTS-NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 692 (Oct. 1979).
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mer property, or to take collateral security from the buyer. The
security should not be taken to secure a promissory note given
the taxpayer for the purchase price, but rather, to secure the obli-
gation under the exchange agreement to purchase like kind prop-
erty and to convey that property to the taxpayer. A provision
liquidating the obligation to an amount equal to the agreed value
of the taxpayer's property in the event of a default would also be
required. This would protect the taxpayer by contractually bind-
ing the parties to an agreed amount of damages in case of a de-
fault. The main problem with this approach is that the buyer may
be unwilling to cooperate in the exchange to this degree. From
the taxpayer's point of view, the problem is that he is conveying
his property and giving up possession, while receiving no down
payment.
Many other arrangements are possible.13 8 All agreements, how-
ever, must contain the following three essentials: first, the intent
to make an exchange; 139 second, the avoidance by the transferor
of the receipt of cash or even the right to receive or control
cash;140 and third, proper documentation.1 41
138. Another possibility is to deposit the funds, used to purchase the exchange
property, into a bank account in which the exchange party and the taxpayer are
joint signatories. This alternative assures the taxpayer that the funds will not be
used improperly by the exchange party. However, the Internal Revenue Service
may claim the taxpayer has "constructive receipt" of the funds and thus, deny the
tax-free exchange. See Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
139. See note 114 supra, and accompanying text.
140. Of course the receipt of cash by the taxpayer would result in the recogni-
tion of ordinary gain. See note 6 supra, and accompanying text. The danger to the
taxpayer, if he has the right to receive or control cash, is that the Internal Revenue
Service may argue that the taxpayer constructively received the cash thus taking
the transaction out of the parameters of section 1031. See, e.g., Carlton v. United
States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967) (the IRS successfully argued that the taxpayer
constructively received funds when the buyer deposited funds with taxpayer al-
though taxpayer had the contractual right to require the buyer to purchase prop-
erty to be exchanged); Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126 (1965), affd, 377 F.2d
534 (9th Cir. 1967); Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
A recent letter ruling by the Internal Revenue Service indicates that the use of
depository funds paid in consideration for the taxpayer's property will be ap-
proved, at least as long as the parties are careful to keep the funds out of the tax-
payer's control. IRS Rev. Rul. 7938087 (June 22, 1978). A note of caution should be
interjected before advising a taxpayer-client to rely on this private letter ruling.
The ruling was issued before the ninth circuit's decision in Starker and appears
inconsistent with the Government's position in Starker. A ruling after the ninth
circuit decision would more likely reflect a relaxation in the Government's posi-
tion.
141. See note 144 infra, and accompanying text.
V. CONCLUSION
Starker is important in the area of collateral estoppel because it
applies the new Montana test to determine the requisite degree
of similarity between the facts of two cases to invoke collateral es-
toppel. In that test, as long as the facts that differ were not essen-
tial to the judgment nor of "controlling significance" in an earlier
case, collateral estoppel would apply in the subsequent case.
A more important aspect of Starker, however, is its holding that
there is no necessity of strict simultaneous transfer of title, both
in time and substance, in order for section 1031 to apply. By also
holding the contract to purchase as a "chose in action" which
qualified under section 1031, the court opens many opportunities
for exchanges of like kind property that would not have been pos-
sible before Starker.142
It must be remembered though, that pitfalls still abound in this
area and careful planning is a necessity in order for the taxpayer
to receive the desired results. 43 Careful documentation is critical
because courts will often use this documentation to determine the
intent and activities of the parties involved. 44 The taxpayer
should not, under the exchange agreement, be able to call off the
exchange and receive cash held in escrow as a protection against
an insolvent buyer. If the taxpayer has this right from the outset,
he may be viewed as having received funds instead of like kind
property, and thereby, be taxed on his gain as if he had sold the
property outright.
Although Starker creates many opportunities for investors and
property owners, the approach to a Starker nonsimultaneous like
kind exchange should be one of caution.
ROBERT B. PAYSINGER
142. This is because the court has equated a contract to purchase (a chose in
action) with like kind property. Therefore properties previously not within the
bounds of like kind property will be available for tax-free exchange treatment.
143. For example, if the taxpayer has the right to change the agreement from
an exchange to a sale, and funds are held in an escrow account for the purchase of
the exchange property, the Internal Revenue Service may contend there is a "con-
structive receipt" of that money by the taxpayer. Thus, the taxpayer would be re-
quired to pay a tax on any gain from that transaction. See note 138 supra.
144. See, e.g., 124 Front Street, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6 (1975) (the court
used documentation to determine intent); Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126
(1965) (lack of documentation concerning intent and transaction was a factor in
decisions against the taxpayer); J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39
T.C. 608 (1962), acq., 1963-2 C.B. 4 (documentation used to show intent to ex-
change).
